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Does your neighbour know you better? 




Abstract. Relationship lending allows local banks to collect private information about their customers and 
to mitigate information asymmetries that often lead to credit rationing. In this paper, we argue that soft 
information collected through relationship lending favors lending decisions even when borrowers’ quality 
is poor from a “hard-information” perspective. We compare the behavior of local versus non-local banks 
using data immediately before and after the 2007-08 Financial Crisis. We exploit the heterogeneity in banks’ 
reliance on soft information to study how their lending strategies changed when firms’ hard-information 
indicators deteriorated after the outbreak of the financial crisis. Our paper shows that firms predominantly 
funded by local banks reported lower credit rationing immediately after the outbreak of the 2007-08 
Financial Crisis. In the same period local banks were also less likely to terminate existing relationships with 
their customers, suggesting that they continued funding their clients even when borrowers’ balance sheet 
variables worsened. We rule out alternative hypotheses explaining our results, such as demand effects, 
“zombie-lending” behavior, or different impacts the financial crisis had on the credit supply of local versus 
local firms. This leads us to conclude that thanks to their greater reliance on soft information, local lenders 
supported their customers to a higher extent during bad times, at least in the period following immediately 
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Local banks play a crucial role in funding small and opaque businesses.  A number of studies have 
shown that the geographical proximity between banks and firms affects the way information is 
processed and collected and, in turn, how credit is made available (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 2002; 
Stein, 2005). The personal relationship local bankers establish with funded entrepreneurs – known 
in the literature as “relationship lending” – allows lenders to acquire private, “soft” information 
from their clients. This relates, among others, to the quality of borrowers’ managerial practices, 
their relationships with suppliers and customers, and their impact on the local economy (Berger, 
1999; Berger and Udell, 2002; Petersen, 2004). 
Owning soft information helps lenders mitigate information asymmetries in credit markets, which 
often lead to credit rationing, as shown in the seminal paper by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Thanks 
to soft information, small and opaque firms are able to receive funding even in absence of public, 
“hard” information (e.g. Berger and Udell, 1995; DeYoung et al., 2004).  
Against this background, a related question is which role soft information plays when hard 
information exists, but it suggests that borrowers have poor quality. In particular, how do banks 
take their lending decisions when borrowers’ hard-information credit assessment suddenly 
becomes discouraging? Findings from this paper that soft information can lead local lenders to 
grant credit when hard information would suggest the opposite. 
 Since local banks establish closer relationships with their borrowers, in principle they can collect 
more accurate information upon perspective customers. It follows that local banks might grant 
credit when soft information reveals that the borrower’s quality is good, despite the firm’s “hard-
information” profile might look poor. In such cases soft information may work as a substitute for 
hard information in lending decisions. 
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On the contrary, non-local lenders build their lending decisions mostly on hard information. As a 
consequence, if the borrower’s “hard-information” quality is not satisfactory, these banks might 
deny credit without resorting to soft information to validate – or change – such assessment. 
We test these predictions using a novel dataset of loans granted by 348 Italian banks to a 
representative sample of 2,373 Italian firms in the years 2007 and 2008. This period coincides with 
the year immediately before and after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which took place in 
September 2008. These data allow us to distinguish between local and non-local banks and to relate 
banks’ lending strategies to banks’ characteristics – and to those of their borrowers – before and 
after the financial crisis. 
Our identification strategy exploits the heterogeneity in banks’ reliance on relationship lending to 
study the lending strategies of local versus non-local banks before and after the outburst of the 
2007-08 Financial Crisis. It builds on two assumptions: first, local banks use soft information to a 
higher extent than non-local banks (e.g. Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010), but they rely on hard 
information to a similar extent. One reason for this is that local banks tend to be more 
geographically concentrated – also because of regulatory issues – and, as such, they can specialize 
to a greater extent – and therefore collect more accurate information – on the firms that are located 
in the local credit markets they operate in.  
Second, firms’ hard-information indicators became unexpectedly worse in the period immediately 
after the outbreak of the financial crisis – but not necessarily their soft-information profile.1 In 
order to account for credit demand, we only select and include in the analysis firms that borrowed 
from both local and non-local banks, the year before the crisis. This allows us to control for any 
potential selection effect in the pool of firms funded by local versus non-local banks, and to 
                                               
1 We will discuss extensively how firms’ balance sheet worsened after the financial crisis spread in Section 5.1. 
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neutralize any differential impact the financial crisis had on firms relying on local versus non-local 
credit.2 
Our hypothesis is that despite firms’ hard-information outlook was negatively affected by the 
outburst of the financial crisis, local banks were able to identify and fund creditworthy firms 
through their soft-information “screening”. Thus, any difference in lending across local and non-
local banks to the same set of firms, once firms’ hard-information indicators deteriorated in 2008, 
should be precisely driven by banks’ different reliance and use of relationship lending. This would 
be true unless the financial crisis hit local and non-local banks in a different way – which we find 
not being the case. 
In line with our predictions, our main finding is that firms borrowing from local banks 
reported lower rates of credit rationing in 2008 than firms borrowing from non-local banks. This 
result is robust after controlling for the characteristics of the bank-firm relationship, banks’ balance 
sheet variables, as well as firms’ characteristics. It also holds after controlling for a set of location-
size-age-industry Fixed Effects (in a similar spirit as Degryse et al., 2018), suggesting that firms’ 
“unobservable’’ traits – those that can only be captured through relationship lending – play a 
significant role in explaining lenders’ supply decisions.  
To explore the mechanism underlying this result, we look at the extensive margin of credit 
and find that local banks were less likely than non-local banks to terminate existing relationships 
with their customers during the financial crisis. Conditional on a relationship being already in place 
when hard-information indicators were good, local banks were less likely to cut such relationship 
as hard-information indicators became poorer. This suggests that local banks were able to leverage 
on soft information to identify good customers.  
Taken together, our findings show that relationship lending plays a crucial role in banks’ 
lending decisions. Thanks to soft information, local banks kept funding their customers to a higher 
                                               
2 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
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extent than non-local lenders when hard-information indicators suddenly worsened. Two caveats 
to our results should however be mentioned. First, to precisely account for the role of hard versus 
soft information, we only look at the evolution of firm-bank relationships conditional on them 
being already in place before the outbreak of the 2007-08 Financial Crisis, when hard-information 
indicators were still satisfactory. On the contrary, we cannot speak to changes in banks’ lending 
decisions – and to the role of soft information – towards firms whose hard-information outlook 
had always been unsatisfactory. Second, ours can be considered as short-term findings – we indeed 
study loan outcomes and firms’ financial constraints only in the year before and after the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers. We cannot speak to how longer-term, real effects of the financial crisis – for 
instance, differential impact of the shock on tradable versus non-tradable sectors – may affect 
firms’ probability to report being credit rationed in later years.  
To complete our analysis, we rule out competing hypotheses that might explain our results. In 
fact, a natural question is whether our findings are driven by local lenders adopting a “zombie 
lending” strategy (Peek and Rosengren, 2005; Albertazzi and Marchetti, 2010), rather than 
funding creditworthy customers identified through soft information. Under this view, local 
banks, which are usually small in size and also less capitalized, might have kept lending to firms 
they had high credit exposure to even during financial crises. This is in order to avoid that such 
firms, once in financial distress, may have compromised the banks’ stability. If this were the case, 
we should observe local banks to be less likely to terminate existing relationships with firms with 
worse balance sheet characteristics or with firms holding relatively high credit shares during the 
financial crisis. This hypothesis is however not confirmed in the data.  In addition, one may 
wonder whether our results are driven by a different impact of the financial shock on local 
versus non-local banks, rather than by differences in lenders’ reliance on soft information. 
Because of their nature, local banks might have been subject to less strict regulatory 
requirements during the financial crisis, thus generating differences in the liquidity provision of 
local versus non-local banks. We study the intensive margin of credit and we find that local and 
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non-local banks did not differently experience credit contraction resulting from the 2007-08 
Financial Crisis.   
All in all, our results show that local lenders, who make larger use of soft information 
through relationship lending, tightened their credit supply to a lower extent than non-local banks 
in 2008. They did so especially when hard-information revealed a poorer firms’ outlook. Our 
findings suggest that soft-information can substitute hard information, and can help lenders make 
better-informed lending decisions. When it is used, as it is the case for local banks, firms experience 
greater credit stability, at least in the short-term, even in periods when their balance sheet 
characteristics significantly worsened. 
Our paper contributes to the literature on soft information and local banks, along several 
dimensions. First, it focuses on the role of relationship lending, in a similar spirit as Liberti (2003; 
2005) and of Liberti and Mian (2009). Second, it looks at the importance of soft information for 
small business funding, particularly in periods of financial downturns. For instance, Gobbi and 
Sette (2013) show that, after Lehman Brothers’ default, firms benefited from closer bank lending 
relationships, both in terms of credit growth and interest rates. In a similar spirit, Gambacorta and 
Mistrulli (2011) document that close lending relationships were effective in insulating firms from 
the financial crisis as their borrowing costs increased less than those of other firms. Presbitero et 
al. (2014) find that in credit markets with a stronger presence of functionally close banks, large, 
good-quality firms have experienced less credit tightening than in functionally distant credit 
markets.   
Our paper also contributes to the literature that studies how to identify and measure soft 
information. Garcia-Appendini (2011) takes an “indirect” approach and shows that banks rely to 
a lower extent on public credit registries when they have access to soft information. In a similar 
spirit, Cerqueiro, Degryse and Ongena (2010) look at residuals in regressions with public credit 
information to quantify soft information. 
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Finally, from a policy perspective, our results highlight the importance of local banks for small 
business funding, even during financial turmoils, as they prove to be important buffers against 
negative shocks for firms.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework our identification 
strategy builds on. Section 3 focuses on local banks and their characteristics; in Section 4 we 
present the data and descriptive statistics. In Section 5 we illustrate results from our analysis. 
Robustness checks are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Testable Predictions  
One of the core differences between local and non-local banks lies in their geographical 
concentration: local banks have a more limited geographical outreach and, as such, a smaller loan 
and customer portfolio.3 Non-local banks, on the contrary, can operate in a larger set of credit 
markets. It follows that, compared to non-local banks, local banks can only cater to a smaller set 
of firms – those that are located in the same credit markets they operate. Therefore, they will 
exclusively focus on lending to such firms, precisely because these firms represent the entire pool 
of (potential) customers. This results into a geographical segmentation of credit markets, wherein 
local banks specialise on certain firms – and possibly on certain industry sectors, depending also 
on the specific local credit market – while non-local banks can diversify their client and lending 
portfolio to a higher extent across different markets.4  
This geographical segmentation results into different lending-technology specializations of 
banks. By focusing on the local economy, local banks are able to collect private, soft information 
                                               
3 This is mostly due to regulatory issues. Credit Cooperative Banks and (some) Savings Bank are subject to territorial 
constraints, see for instance: http://www.creditocooperativo.it/template/default.asp?i_menuID=35356. A 
translation of this page is available upon request. 
4 In fact, if we look to our data, we find that local banks operate on average in 2 local credit markets, vis-à-vis 30 for 
non-local banks.  
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to a greater extent.5 Soft information has thus more weight in lending decisions for local banks 
than for non-local ones. 
At the same time, the extent to which both types of banks collect and process hard 
information – like firms’ balance sheets, financial statements, and credit registries – should be 
similar across banks.  
We make the hypothesis that in normal times, when firm’ hard-information indicators are 
not affected by financial shocks, hard information and soft information provide a similar 
assessment of a firm’s quality. In fact, it is reasonable to think that if the firm has high productivity, 
rarely the management practices adopted are bad. 
During financial shocks however – or at least in the period immediately following the 
outbreak of a financial crisis – hard information worsens, but not necessarily soft information 
worsens, too. This is especially true when the causes of hard-information deterioration are not 
firm-specific, but rather systemic, as it was during the 2007-08 Financial Crisis.6  
This implies that local banks can potentially have a larger set of information to use in making 
lending decisions. And when hard information worsens, they might still keep lending to firms in 
their local community proving that private information is promising. 
In light of this discussion, we make the following testable prediction: 
 
                                               
5 There are many reasons why this could be the case: first, the branch network of local banks is concentrated only in 
certain areas/markets thus facilitating interactions with customers and the consequent collection of private 
information; second, the distance between the bank’s headquarter and branches is smaller, thus information between 
different layers of the banking institutions can be exchanged faster (see among others Alessandrini et al., 2009). There 
is also plenty of anecdotal evidence on the behavior of managers and customers of local banks (in particular of Credit 
Cooperative Banks).   
6 For instance, while firms’ productivity or employment can significantly worsen during financial downturns, it is hard 
to imagine that an entrepreneur would adopt worse managerial practices, or that cultural norms would change during 
financial crises. 
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Prediction: As the quality of a firm worsens, only banks that rely on soft information will keep lending to this 
firm, as long as soft information reveals that the firm’s quality is good. 
 
In order to test this Prediction, we consider the universe of loans that a panel of 2,373 Italian firms 
received from 348 Italian banks in 2007 and 2008 and study whether firms that were funded by 
local banks to a larger extent reported lower levels of credit rationing.  All these firms borrowed 
from both local and non-local banks, both before and after outbreak of the financial crisis. This 
reduces any potential sample-selection bias. Since these firms received credit before the crisis by 
non-local banks – who mostly rely on hard information to make lending decisions – this suggests 
that their hard-information indicators before the financial crisis were good – or good enough to 
be funded. It follows that, for the above discussion, also their soft-information quality was good, 
as well. The unanticipated outbreak of the financial crisis thus allows us to study to what extent 
this sample of firms, which were good ex-ante – both from a hard-information and a soft-
information point of view – received funding from local versus non-local banks once their hard-
information indicators worsened, conditional on their soft-information quality still remaining 
good.7  
In order to do so, we focus on the following tests which allow us to confirm the theory of 
geographical segmentation – and the respective role of local and non-local banks in using different 
types of information and lending technologies – we have in mind: First, we study the geographical 
concentration of local versus non-local banks, and in particular whether a market segmentation 
exists – in particular, whether local banks are more likely to lend in a smaller set of local credit 
markets, or to specific industry sectors. If it is the case, this would influence banks’ lending 
strategies as the number of firms and their industry focus would be different. Second, we look at 
                                               
7 As we already discussed, it is reasonable to assume that borrowers’ characteristics that can be identified through 
relationship lending are unlikely to be correlated with a financial crisis, and less so in a negative way. 
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the characteristics of firms funded by local versus non-local banks, in order to assess whether local 
banks vis-à-vis non-local banks specialise in different types of firms. If our conjecture is correct, 
we should observe firms that rely on local banks to a larger extent to be more opaque on average 
– e.g. they should be younger, smaller, and potentially more leveraged and riskier than firms that 
tend to rely on non-local banks to a greater extent. If this is the case, it would also imply that local 
banks should largely rely on soft information to fund these firms and assess their creditworthiness. 
As already mentioned, by only selecting multiple-borrowing firms that have at least one loan from 
each type of banks (local and non-local), we can control for any firm-specific shock that could 
affect the lending decisions of local versus non-local banks. 
Finally, to rule out a differential impact of the financial crisis on local versus non-local banks which 
may follow from different exposure towards different types of firms, we study both the extensive 
and the intensive margin of credit.  
Results from all these tests are presented in greater detail in the next sections.  
 
3.  Measuring bank localism 
In this paragraph we discuss how we define local banks and how we use such categorization in our 
analysis. Bank localism can be described by a set of characteristics – e.g. narrow geographical 
outreach, simple organizational structure – that allow local lenders to have a stronger bond with 
the local economy than non-local banks. The existing literature has in fact identified local banks 
as financial institutions either with fewer managerial levels (Berg and Udell, 2002), or that are 
geographically concentrated in few local credit markets (Hannan and Prager, 2004; Hannan 2006), 
or with relatively short distances between the headquarter and the branches (Alessandrini et al., 
2010; Jiménez et al., 2009). In contrast with these papers, we introduce a novel measure of bank 
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localism that takes simultaneously into account banks’ geographical concentration in local credit 
markets, and the relative size – in terms of volume of credit – of these markets. 
 The underlying idea is that, to be classified as local, not only banks should be concentrated in 
fewer local credit markets, but these markets should be relatively small – local banks should be the 
main lenders in those markets. It is precisely through their relative importance for a certain credit 
market that local banks can collect soft information to a higher extent than non-local banks. Think 
of a bank that operates in very few small-size credit markets. This bank will probably lend to firms 
that are connected among each other because they belong to the same supply chain or industrial 
cluster. This, in turn, allows this bank to play a key role in those markets, and to gather a detailed 
understanding of the economic, but also of the social and cultural context it operates in. Such bank 
corresponds exactly to a local bank. 
Our measure of bank localism is built matching different data sources: first, the Italian Credit 
Register, which contains information on the volumes of credit each bank lends to each firm. 
Second, the 2001 Italian National Census carried out by the Italian National Statistics Institute 
(ISTAT), which identifies 686 Local Labour Market Areas (LLMAs) throughout the Italian 
territory.8 This is used to relate each firm’s municipality to its corresponding LLMAs, and to 
calculate the amount credit lent by banks in each LLMA.9 
Our measure of localism consists in a simplified version of Williams’ index, which was first used 
to study firms’ specialization across local labour market areas (Williams, 1991).10  The index is 
                                               
8 Yet, firms in our dataset are spread across a lower number of LLMAs. Therefore, we end up with 393 LLMAs in 
our final dataset from the initial 686 LLMAs. LLMAs are defined as a set of adjacent municipalities linked by daily 
commuter flows for work purposes. More precisely, a LLMA “is a cluster of municipalities whose self-containment in terms of 
commuting passes a minimum threshold [in terms of number of residents and available jobs]” (Casado-Díaz, 2007). 
9 The adoption of LLMAs as a proxy for local credit markets allows us to capture very precisely the extent to which a 
bank operates in the territory. At the same time, LLMAs, because of their dimension and number, are able to 
incorporate much more variation than Italian provinces. In Italy, there were 107 provinces versus 686 LLMAs (data 
refer to 2010). 
10 Williams’ index  is used to classify firms into more or less specialized, according to both their production shares 
over one or several sub-markets and to the relative size of these sub-markets compared to the overall production 
market. Farabullini and Gobbi (2000) later apply this index to the Italian banking sector to define banks’ degree of 
specialization. Their measure takes into account the number of local credit markets where banks operate (through 
loans, deposits, and bank offices), and the weight of these local credit markets on the national credit market. To the 
best of our knowledge, however, we are the first to adopt Williams’ index to generate a measure of bank localism. 
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constructed at the bank level, is time variant, and identifies the extent to which a bank j in year t 
that operates in k=1,2,…,m LLMAs is local, based on the volumes of credit lent in each of those 
LLMAs. It is computed as follows: 








234                                                             (1)                                                     
where for all LLMAs where bank j operates in year t: i) cjkt is the amount of credit bank j lends in 
LLMA k in year t; ii) cjt is the total amount of credit lent by bank j in year t; iii) ckt is the amount of 
credit borrowed in the LLMA k by all firms headquartered in LLMA k, and iv) ct  is the total amount 
of credit lent in year t.  
According to such measure, a bank will be more local the higher is its credit concentration across 
fewer LLMAs, and the lower is the weight – in terms of credit volume – of these LLMAs on the 
overall credit market. This measure ranges from zero to two: low levels of the index are associated 
with banks that spread their credit equally across local credit markets in accordance with their 
relative sizes – these banks are thus classified as non-local. High values of the index, on the 
contrary, identify local banks – those that tend to concentrate their credit over smaller local credit 
markets. Consider for instance the case of a credit market characterized by two local credit markets 
(A and B) and four banks (Bank 1, 2, 3 and 4). Table 1 below shows two different hypothetical 










  Table 1. Examples of the index computation 
Panel A Market A Market B A+B index  
Bank 1 10 100 110 0.00 
Bank 2 10 100 110 0.00 
Bank 3 10 100 110 0.00 
Bank 4 10 0 10 1.56 
Total credit 40 300 340  
 
Panel B Market A Market B A+B index  
Bank 1 10 100 110 0.00 
Bank 2 10 100 110 0.00 
Bank 3 10 100 110 0.00 
Bank 4 0 10 10 0.02 
Total credit 30 310 340   
 
In the first scenario (Table 1, Panel A), Bank 4 lends all its credit in Market A, which is small 
compared to Market B, and populated by banks that lend relatively small, but identical credit 
volumes. On the contrary, Bank 4 does not lend at all in Market B, which is larger, and where 
other banks operate on a much larger scale. Market A is very important for Bank 4 – all its credit 
is concentrated there – and the bank itself is relatively important for the local market (its market 
share is 25 per cent). Therefore, the index of localism takes a high value, as the bank can be 
considered local, for our purposes.  
Conversely, consider the scenario depicted in Panel B, Table 1. In this case, Bank 4 lends all its 
credit in a much larger credit market, Market B, where other banks have a larger and deeper 
presence. On the contrary, it does not lend at all in a smaller credit market like Market A. In this 
case, while the market is still very important for the bank (all its credit is concentrated there), the 
importance of Bank 4 in Market B as shown in Panel B is largely undermined by the presence of 
its competitors, but also by the fact that the share of credit lent by Bank 4 over the total credit lent 
in Market B is marginal – its market share is less than 3 per cent. Also, Bank 4 is not involved at 
all in Market A, where it could have been much more important given the relatively low presence 
of Bank 1, 2, 3. In this case, according to our index, this bank will be classified as less local than in 
Panel A. 
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Compared to the existing measures of bank localism, our index includes two novel aspects: First, 
banks’ geographical concentration is defined not only based on the number of credit markets 
where a bank operates, but also on the volume of credit disbursed in those markets. In this sense, 
our index considers the level of bank competition in terms of loans at the local credit market level. 
A bank that operates in more than one local credit market may be local or not depending on the 
relative size of these markets with respect to the overall Italian credit market.11 Second, our 
measure has the advantage of evaluating the importance of each bank in every single market, thus 
going beyond the mere bank-size dimension, traditionally considered as a key aspect for localism. 
For instance, a bank that is classified as small according to the dimensional criterion, not necessarily 
will be local.  
 
3.1 Banks’ localism versus other banks’ dimensions 
Table 2 below shows how banks in our sample are classified based on our index of localism, as 
well as their size.12 Interestingly, Table 2 shows that almost 45% of minor and small banks in our 
sample are classified as not local. A potential explanation for this apparently contradictory result 
is that these banks operate in markets with high bank competition and therefore, despite they are 
small, they fail in becoming the main local lender for their firms. 13 At the same time, one big bank 
out of nine is classified as local. Though it might seem surprising at first glance, this big, although 
local bank, indeed operates in 5 local credit markets only – vis-à-vis an average 71 for the other 8 
big banks.14  
                                               
11 Still, as we will discuss in the next section, the number of LLMAs were local banks operate is significantly lower 
than for non-local banks. 
12 The dimensional information is provided by the Bank of Italy, Annual Report 2009. Bank classification based on 
size builds on banks’ assets. In addition, as our index is expressed as a continuous variable, to ease banks’ classification 
we now consider the median of its distribution and classify intermediaries whose index is above the median as local, 
and non-local otherwise. Table 2 shows 346 observations instead of 348 as the dimensional classification is not 
available for two banks in our sample. 
13 We also conduct a similar analysis based on banks’ institutional category. The analysis reveals that almost 80% of 
Italian cooperative banks are classified as local; on the contrary, only one-fourth of mutual banks fall under this 
definition. Similarly, about one-fifth of joint-stock companies (Italian “Società per azioni”) are local, as well. 
14 More interestingly, all the credit lent by this big, but local, bank, is concentrated in two sectors only: energy and 
services. Big, non-local banks, instead, all lend more than 70% of their credit in the manufacturing sector. 
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  Table 2. Banks’ classification (local versus other characteristics) 









small banks  
Total 
Non-local banks  6 8 27 132 173 
Local banks  0 1 0 173 174 
Total  6 9 27 305 346 
 
 
Finally, we compute a few balancing tests to study average differences between local and non-local 
banks in terms of geographical concentration (expressed in terms of numbers of local credit market 
areas they lend to), total credit disbursed, and type of industry sector they focus their lending 
activities on. Results are shown in Table 3 below. Local banks operate on average in 2 LLMAs, 
vis-à-vis 30 LLMAs for non-local banks. Moreover, the total outstanding loan portfolio of local 
banks in 2007 was 3% the total outstanding loan portfolio of non-local banks, suggesting that local 
banks give way fewer, and smaller loans than non-local banks. Finally, we look at whether local 
banks specialise in different industry sectors compared with non-local banks.15 We find that local 
banks are significantly more likely to lend to firms operating in Services, whereas non-local banks 
are significantly more likely to lend to firms in the Manufacturing sector. 







(2) – (1) 
Number of LLMAs 1.912 30.505 
 
28.591*** 
 (0.124) (3.917) (3.885) 
Total credit disbursed (log) 13.903 17.232 3.329*** 
 (0.157) (0.150) (0.217) 
Share of firms in Services 0.635 0.695 0.060** 
 (0.024) (0.012) (0.027) 
Share of firms in Manufacturing 0.330 0.272 -0.058** 
 (0.022) (0.012) (0.025) 
Number of Observations 172 176 348 
 
                                               
15 It must be noticed here that almost 97% of the firms in our sample operate either in Manufacturing (71%) or 
Services (26%). 
 16 
4.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1. Data 
Our novel dataset is built from different sources. The first set of data is obtained from the Bank 
of Italy’s survey of industrial and service firms with at least twenty workers (INVIND). This survey 
is carried out once a year on a stratified sample of Italian firms and contains unique questions 
designed to elicit information on their financing needs and the existence of credit rationing. We 
match the firms in the INVIND sample with the Italian Central Credit Register (Centrale dei Rischi). 
This dataset contains information on the credit borrowed by Italian non-financial firms to banks 
operating in Italy. Merging these two data sources allows us to assess every single loan amount 
borrowed by each firm in the INVIND survey from any bank operating in the Italian credit market. 
We then obtain firms’ balance sheets information from the CERVED dataset, comprising official 
records filed with Italian Chambers of Commerce and reported by the Cerved Group. Finally, 
banks’ characteristics are obtained from both Supervisory Reports and Bank of Italy Annual 
Reports. For each bank in the dataset, we classify them into local and non-local, based on the index 
we discussed in Section 3.16 By matching these data sources, we end up with a panel 2,373 firms 
borrowing from 348 banks – both local and non-local – over the years 2007 and 2008. 
 
4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Our dataset allows us to create a measure of credit rationing at the firm level. This is 
constructed using the unique information we obtain from the INVIND survey. We classify as 
                                               
16 Banks are classified as local or not local depending on whether their index of localism is above or below the median 
of the index distribution. 
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credit rationed firms that were in need of additional funds but stated that their funding request 
was turned down by the financial intermediaries they contacted.17  
Table 6 in the Appendix summarises the characteristics of the firms and the banks in our sample, 
evaluated in 2007. Panel A shows that three per cent of firms reported experiencing credit 
rationing. This share is consistent with findings from other studies – ECB’s SAFE survey in the 
EU countries,18 or surveys conducted in France by Insee and OSEO.19 In terms of balance sheet 
characteristics, firms are on average 42 years old and 63% of them has more than 50 employees. 
Consistent with these data, firms’ average ROA is 1.469. Firms appear moderately risky: the 
average risk rating in our sample is 4.6 on a scale from 1 (very safe) to 9 (very risky). Panel B of 
Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for banks’ variables. Banks’ size is expressed as a discrete index 
going from 1 (major banks) to 7 (minor banks). The median bank’s size in our sample is 5, revealing 
that half of the banks in our sample are small and minor banks. The average value of the index of 
localism, computed in Section 3, is 0.571. 
In terms of relationship lending variables, Panel C of Table 6 shows that the median number of 
bank relationships for each firm is 7, suggesting that most of the firms in our sample engage in 
multiple bank lending relationships.20 In addition, only 7% of the bank-firm relationships in place 
in 2007 were interrupted in 2008 suggesting that once formed, such relationships are pretty stable. 
 
 
                                               
17 Our measure of credit rationing is obtained by combining the outcomes of two separate questions of the INVIND 
survey: in the first question, firms were asked whether they needed more funding than what they had actually received; 
in the second, firms were asked whether the banks they addressed to receive more funding had eventually turned 
down their credit request. Answers to both questions are reported in binary form. Both questions are from Part 5 
(Firm Funding) of the survey. The firms were asked to answer first to question V316 “You should indicate if, given the 
firm’s cost and collateral conditions, you ask for more debt load”; then to question V267 “Please indicate if the contacted financial 
intermediaries proved not to be willing to increase your funding volume”. We classify firms reporting a positive answer to both 
questions as financially constrained. 
18 Survey on the access to finance of SMEs in the euro area, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/surveys/sme/html/index.en.html. We thank Denis Fougère and Patrick Sevestre 
for pointing this out. 
19 http://www.oseo.fr/notre mission/publications/etudes et rapports/generalistes. 
20 We will discuss the extent to which firms in our sample borrow from more than one bank in greater detail below. 
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5. Identification Strategy 
Our identification strategy exploits the heterogeneity in banks’ reliance on soft information to 
study the lending strategies of local versus non-local banks before and after the outburst of the 
2007-08 Financial Crisis. It builds on the assumption that the extent to which banks use soft 
information positively correlates with their level of localism.21  
We test this prediction by looking at a set of correlations between firms’ characteristics and their 
probability to be funded by local banks – a variable that we call !"#$!5,07789999999999999. We employ a sample 
of 2,500 firms that either borrow from both local and non-local banks or firms that borrow from 
only one type of banks.	 
Our firm-level variables include among others size, age, profitability, riskiness assessment – taken 
from both the INVIND and the CERVED dataset and evaluated the year before the financial 
crisis started. !"#$!5,07789999999999999 is the measure of bank localism constructed in (1), averaged at the firm 
level. This expresses the extent to which firms are funded by local versus non-local banks and it is 
computed as follows: 
!"#$!5&999999999 = ∑ ;
*<+-
*<-
∗ !"#$!%&>?%34                                              (2) 
that is, for all the banks that lend to firm i in year t, we take the weighted average of the banks’  
index of localism (!"#$!%&), the weights being the share of credit borrowed by firm i from bank j  
in year t over the total amount of credit borrowed by firm i in year t.22   
In order to control for potential endogeneity, we look at this set of correlations before the outburst 
of the financial crisis. Results are shown in Table 4 below.  
 
                                               
21 This is because of the geographical concentration of local banks in fewer, and smaller, local credit markets compared 
to non-local banks. 
22 We construct the weights using loan data from the Italian Credit Register.   
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Table 4. Correlation matrix – firms’ variables  
This table reports correlation coefficients between firm variables. We include firms’ ROA, ROE, EBITDA, size (a 
dummy which takes the value of one if the firm has more than 50 employees), age, leverage and rating. The first 
column shows correlations between Local bank and firms’ balance sheet variables. Local bank is computed as the 
weighted average at the firm level of banks’ index of localism, the weights being the shares of credit 
borrowed by the firm from each funding bank. *** correlation coefficient significant at 1 per cent; ** at 5 




 local bank ROA ROE EBITDA size age leverage rating 
local bank 1               
ROA -0.0089 1             
ROE 0.0095 0.1232*** 1           
EBITDA 0.0148*** 0.6644*** 0.1039*** 1         
size -0.1382*** 0.0819*** 0.0327*** 0.0857*** 1       
age -0.0549*** 0.039*** -0.0043 0.0113 0.1102*** 1     
leverage 0.1173*** -0.4494*** -0.032*** 0.3378*** -0.0704*** -0.1134*** 1   





Consistent with our assumption, there is a positive relationship between firms’ reliance on local 
banks and their opaqueness: age and size are negatively correlated with local-banks reliance, while 
leverage is negatively correlated. Interestingly, both the EBITDA and the overall risk assessment 
are positively correlated with local bank.  
 
Since we observe a potential selection issue for firms funded by local versus non-local banks, this 
further motivates the need to conduct our analysis only with firms that in 2007 borrowed from 
both local and non-local banks. This restricts our sample to 2,373 firms, thus dropping 5% of the 
firms from the initial sample as these were borrowing exclusively from either local or non-local 
banks. Although the share of firms we are discarding from the analysis is very small, we conduct a 
set of balancing checks to study how different is the sample of firms that engaged in single 
borrowing in 2007 vis-à-vis multiple borrowing. Results are shown in Appendix, Table 7. Multiple-
borrowing firms appear significantly larger on average (in terms of assets), they borrow more 
credit, and they are significantly more likely to operate in the Services sector. No differences 
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between the two samples can be detected in terms of profitability, age, number of employees, or 
the reliance on local-banks funding. All in all, results from Table 7 suggest that by discarding single-
borrowing banks, we are still considering firms that are quite similar and which, on the other hand, 
borrow the largest share of credit in the market. 
 
  
5.1 Credit rationing during the 2007-08 Financial Crisis 
Before turning to the main analysis, we study whether firms’ characteristics worsened during the 
financial crisis. This exercise is used to understand whether firms’ characteristics worsened in 2008, 
compared with 2007. We estimate the following regression equation at the firm level: 
@ABC	#ℎ$B$#EFBAGEA#H,& = I7 + I4#BAGAG& + KH + LH,&                    (3) 
where @ABC	#ℎ$B$#EFBAGEA#H,& is a set of firms’ characteristics measured in year t, with 
t=2007;2008 and #BAGAG& is a dummy that takes the value of zero in year 2007 and one in year 
2008. KH are firms fixed effects. Results from equation (3) are shown in Table 5 below.  
 
Table 5. Before and after the crisis - Firms’ variables  
This table reports results from estimates used to test differences across firms’ balance sheet characteristics 
before and after the financial crisis. We include as dependent variables the probability a firm reports being 
credit rationed, firms’ ROA, ROE, EBITDA, size (a dummy which takes the value of one if the firm has 
more than 50 employees), age, leverage and rating. crisis is a dummy that takes the value of one in 2008 and 
zero in 2007. OLS estimates are shown. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** coefficient significant at 1 
per cent; ** at 5 per cent; * at 10 per cent.  
 
 
Dep. Variable p(credrat) ROA ROE EBITDA size age leverage rating 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
crisis 0.054*** -1.054*** -15.186* -1.653*** 0.004 -0.021 -5.338*** 0.095 
 (0.007) (0.181) (8.836) (0.191) (0.004) (0.136) (1.359) (0.084) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N. of firms 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373 2,373 
Observations 4,257 4,257 4,257 4,257 4,257 4,257 4,257 4,257 
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Results from Table 5 show that firms’ hard-information outlook became poorer in 2008 compared 
with 2007. The probability that firms report credit rationing almost doubled during the crisis, with 
5.5% per cent of firms reporting credit rationing in 2008 versus less than 3% in 2007, as shown in 
Table 1. Moreover, during the crisis, firms’ balance sheet indicators significantly worsened. Firms 
became on average less profitable and reported lower revenues. The average leverage however 
significantly decreased, potentially reflecting the increase in credit rationing.23 
Keeping results from Table 5 in mind, we study whether firms reported a lower credit rationing 
from local banks than from non-local banks, in 2008 vis-à-vis 2007. Our hypothesis is that firms 
who received funding during periods of financial stability from both local and non-local banks – 
which is suggestive of good hard-information and soft-information indicators – should have 
experienced larger credit tightening during periods of financial downturns by non-local lenders. 
This is because during such times their hard-information outlook worsened and non-local banks 
were less able than local banks to collect soft information to assess whether their existing 
customers were still worth funding. We use a Difference-in-Difference approach to compare the 
probability that firms with higher versus lower reliance on local banks report to be credit rationed 
across two periods, the year before and after the financial crisis. We estimate the following 
regression equation at the firm level24, only with those firms that in 2007 borrowed from both local 
and non-local banks, to account for credit demand effects:  
 
M(#BFOB$E)H& = I7 + I4!"#$!5,07789999999999999 + I0#BAGAG& + IQR!"#$!5,07789999999999999 ∗ #BAGAG&S + LH&          (4)                                                                                                                                    
 
where M(#BFOB$E)H&  is the probability that firm i reports having experienced credit rationing 
(derived from INVIND); #BAGAG& is a dummy which takes the value of one in 2008 and zero 
otherwise, and !"#$!5,07789999999999999 is our measure of bank localism computed at the firm level, as shown in 
                                               
23 The leverage is indeed defined as debt over equity. 
24 This is because the self-reported measure of credit rationing obtained from INVIND is a firm-level variable. 
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(2).25 We are particularly interested in the sign and the significance of IQ, the Diff-in-Diff 
coefficient. We use both a probit and a linear probability model to estimate equation (4). Results 
are shown in Table 8. Column (1) shows the marginal effects of our estimates (using the probit 
model) without adding controls. The coefficient of the interaction term !"#$!5,07789999999999999 ∗ #BAGAG& is 
negative and significant, revealing that the higher is the firm’s reliance on local banks, the lower 
the likelihood to report having being credit rationed during the financial crisis. We then add firms’ 
and banks’ controls in further specifications shown in column (2), (3), (4). Controls include firms’ 
age, assets, number of employees, ROA, ROE and rating, as well as a set of dummies indicating 
the industry the firm belongs to and the local credit market in which the firm is located.  We also 
add the firm’s number of bank lending relationships and whether the firm’s main lender – the bank 
which granted the firm the highest share of credit – belongs to one of the top five banking group 
in Italy. Finally, we include a set of banks’ characteristics averaged at the firm level using an 
approach akin to how we computed  !"#$!5,07789999999999999. This set of variables comprises banks’ size, the 
share of loans not funded on the retail market and banks’ capital ratio. We estimate the 
specification with controls using both a probit and a Linear Probability Model, in column (2) and 
(3), respectively. IQ remains negative and significant,26 even after including banks’ size, confirming 
that our measure of localism captures a different dimension from banks’ dimension. Finally, 
Column (4) of Table 8 shows estimates from Equation (4) using a Linear Probability Model with 
location-age-sector-size Fixed Effects. Given that the dependent variable, M(#BFOB$E)H&, has 
limited variability, the inclusion of firm Fixed Effects in the Diff-in-Diff estimation might lead to 
biased estimates (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).27 To still account for firms’ unobserved 
heterogeneity, we use a set of granular fixed effects in a similar spirit as Degryse et al. (2018). 
                                               
 
26 It must be noted that due to variable collinearity there is a significant drop in the number of observations in the 
estimates shown in Column (2). However, estimates using a Linear Probability Model (column 3 of Table 2) confirm 
the main results. 
27 This is because we would be estimating (5) on a balanced panel of firms – thus excluding those firms that enter or 
exit because of funding constraints. 
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Results are shown in Column (4) of Table 8. IQ is still negative and significant, and with similar 
magnitude as in the previous specifications. 
All in all, Table 8 shows that, conditional on being funded by both local and non-local banks, firms 
reported a lower rate of credit rationing during the financial crisis, the higher their reliance on local 
banks. These results are robust to the inclusion of both firms’ and banks’ variables. This confirms 
our hypothesis that when hard-information variables significantly worsened – as shown in Table 
5 – lenders who rely on soft-information to a larger extent were less likely to curtail credit to firms. 
 
5.2 Extensive margin of credit 
The main result from Table 8 is that firms experienced a lower credit tightening during the financial 
crisis from lenders that rely on soft-information to a higher extent. The underlying intuition is that 
local banks keep funding their customers when hard-information worsens, precisely because they 
rely on soft-information to compensate for “bad” hard-information indicators.  
To test this hypothesis, we use data from the Italian Credit Registry, which provides information 
on every loan borrowed by each firm in our sample. For each firm-bank relationship, we know in 
which year the loan was disbursed, its amount, and whether the lender for that particular loan was 
a local or non-local one, based on the definition we previously discussed.  
This allows us to compute the extensive margin of credit and to study whether local lenders were 
indeed less likely than non-local ones to cut credit to their existing customers. 
We estimate the following regression equation using a probit model: 
M(EFBCAT$EF)H%077U = V7 + V4O!"#$!%0778 + LH%                                   (5) 
where the dependent variable, M(EFBCAT$EF)H%077U is the probability that a lending relationship 
between firm i and bank j that existed in 2007 is terminated in 2008, and O!"#$!%0778 is a dummy 
 24 
that takes the value of one if bank j is local and zero otherwise.28 Results from equation (5) are 
shown in table 9, column (1). V4 is negative and statistically significant: local banks were less likely 
than non-local banks to cut relationships with their current customers during their financial crisis. 
The coefficient of O!"#$!%0778 is negative and significant also after controlling for firms’ and banks’ 
characteristics, in column (2) and (3) respectively. Taken together, results from table 8 and 9 
indicate that local banks kept funding their customers even if their hard-information indicators 
looked poorer – possibly because they made use of soft-information to identify good borrowers. 
Results from Table 9 confirm the prediction we formulated in Section 2: when the quality of a 
firm worsened, as it was the case in 2008, banks relying on soft information kept lending to their 
existing customers to a larger extent.  
 
6. Robustness Checks 
Our analysis so far has shown that firms borrowing from local banks in 2008 reported a lower 
rate of credit rationing than firms borrowing from not local banks. This result can be explained 
by the fact that local banks make a greater use of soft information compared with non-local 
banks. During periods of financial downturns, when hard-information deteriorates, local banks 
can use soft-information to validate their lending choices and keep their old customers. 
Yet, there are potentially other explanations for our results: first, the lower credit rationing 
reported by firms predominantly funded by local banks could be driven by a heterogeneous 
impact the financial crisis had on the credit supply of local versus non-local banks. According to 
this view, local banks – who are indeed significantly more likely to be small than non-local banks 
– were subject to less strict capital regulatory requirements than not local banks during the 
financial crisis. It follows that local banks might have suffered from the liquidity contraction 
following the collapse of Lehman Brothers to a lower extent than non-local banks. This, in turn, 
                                               
28 We take the median of !"#$!W2007 to identify whether a bank is local or not. 
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might have translated into a higher funds availability for local banks, thus explaining why these 
lenders were less likely to tighten credit to their borrowers. 
Second, local banks might have been less likely to turn down existing relationships during the 
financial crisis not because they were able to identify and keep funding good borrowers thanks to 
the use of soft information, but as a result of a “zombie-lending” strategy. Local banks might have 
lent to customers at risk of financial distress to “keep them alive”. The reason for such behaviour 
is quite understandable: having limited diversification strategies – and also relative larger exposure 
towards the firms they fund – the losses local banks would incur in case of their customers’ 
bankruptcy would be important, and might undermine the financial stability of the bank itself. 
In what follows, we show than none of these competitive hypotheses find support in the data.  
 
6.1. Intensive margin of credit 
We first look at the intensive margin of credit to study whether there are any differences in the 
credit supply of local versus non-local banks that could justify our results. We estimate the 
following equation at the bank level: 
∆log	(#BFOAE)%& = V7 + V4O!"#$!%0778 + V0#BAGAG& + VQRO!"#$!%0778 ∗ #BAGAG&S + _%&	           (6) 
where the dependent variable is the growth rate of credit of bank j in year t. This is constructed 
using data from the Credit Register.29 O!"#$!%0778	is a dummy that equals to one if bank j’s index 
of localism !"#$!%& is above the median value of the index in year 2007, and zero otherwise. We 
introduce the interaction term O!"#$!%0778 ∗ #BAGAG& and study whether, during the crisis, local 
banks lent to a greater extent than non-local banks. 
Results from equation (6) are reported in Table 10 using OLS. We also include bank fixed effects 
in Column (2). As expected, the coefficient of the #BAGAG& dummy reveals a dramatic slow-down in 
                                               
29 We use also Credit Registry data from 2006 to compute credit growth rate in 2007. 
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the credit growth at the bank level both in column (1) and (2). In addition, the coefficient of 
O!"#$!%0778 is negative and significant in all specifications. Its sign and significance reveal that on 
average, the growth rate of credit from local banks is significantly lower than for non-local banks. 
However, the Diff-in-Diff coefficient, VQ, is never significant. This suggests that during the 
financial crisis local banks did not lend more than non-local banks. Results from Table 10 rule out 
the hypothesis that our results are driven by differences in the credit supply between local and 
non-local banks resulting from different regulatory constraints. On the contrary, they corroborate 
our intuition that differences in lending are driven by a different type of relationships local versus 
non-local banks have with their customers. 
 
6.2. Zombie-lending strategies 
To rule out that our results are driven by a zombie-lending strategy, we study the extensive margin 
of credit and look at the characteristics of the firms that local banks were more likely to keep 
funding during the financial crisis. We estimate the following regression equation at the loan level: 
M(EFBCAT$EF)H%077U = V7 + V4O!"#$!%0778 + V0@ABC	#ℎ$B$#EFBAGEA#A,2007 +
VQO!"#$!%0778 ∗ @ABC	#ℎ$B$#EFBAGEA#A,2007 + LH%               (7) 
where M(EFBCAT$EF)H%077U is the probability that a firm-bank relationship that was in place in 
year 2007 was terminated in 2008. @ABC	#ℎ$B$#EFBAGEA#H,0778 is a set of firms’ characteristics 
including ROA, revenues, size, leverage, and rating, evaluated before the financial crisis. We 
include the interaction term between @ABC	#ℎ$B$#EFBAGEA#H,0778 and  O!"#$!%0778 to precisely 
assess which firms local banks were less likely to terminate existing relationships. Results from 
equation (7) are shown in Table 11. If our results were to be explained by a zombie-lending story, 
we should observe local banks to be less likely to terminate existing relationships with firms with 
worse balance sheet characteristics – that is, less profitable, smaller, riskier firms. This is however 
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not the case – VQ is not significant when we look at the interaction term between O!"#$!%0778 and 
firms’ ROA or EBITDA, for instance. However, local banks appear less likely to cut existing 
relationships with high-leverage firms. Having high leverage does not imply that the firm is “bad”, 
rather that it is using more resources possibly to invest in high-risk/high-return business activities. 
Still, being high leveraged may affect a firm’s rating: this might explain why in column (5) we find 
local banks to be less likely to terminate existing relationships with firms with worse rating. 
 All in all, our results are consistent with a “soft-information” story – local banks kept funding 
opaque firms, which however do not appear to be less profitable or smaller firms. This 
corroborates our original Prediction formulated in Section 2: as the firms’ hard-information quality 
worsened, only local banks kept lending, provided that soft information revealed that the firm’s 
quality is good. 
Finally, we also look at whether local banks were less likely to terminate existing relationships with 
firms with whom they had a relatively high credit exposure. It might be in fact the case that they 
kept funding these firms precisely because they wanted to be sure they could retrieve their 
outstanding credit. Column (7) of Table 11 however shows that the interaction term between 
O!"#$!%0778 and Gℎ$BF	#BFOAE	`$TaH,0778 is positive and significant. This suggests that local 
banks, during the financial crisis, were less likely to interrupt relationships with firms they were 
less exposed to. Results from Table 11 lead us reject a zombie-lending story explaining our results, 
and once more confirm our hypothesis that local banks lent to a higher extent during the financial 
crisis precisely because they used soft information to a higher extent. 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we show that soft information can lead local lenders to grant credit, in cases when 
hard information would suggest the opposite. 
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We use data from the Italian credit market and we compare the behaviour of local versus non-
local banks using a novel dataset that contains information on loans, as well as on firms’ and banks’ 
characteristics, before and after the 2007-08 Financial Crisis. Our identification strategy exploits 
the heterogeneity in banks’ reliance on soft information to study the lending strategies of local 
versus non-local banks in 2007 vis-à-vis 2008. It builds on the assumption that local banks use soft 
information to a higher extent than non-local banks but they rely on hard information to a similar 
extent.  
Our results show that firms predominantly funded by local banks reported a lower credit rationing 
in 2008 compared with 2008. We also find that local banks were less likely to terminate existing 
relationships with their customers during the financial crisis, suggesting that local banks continued 
funding their clients even when borrowers’ balance sheet variables worsened. Our results cannot 
be explained by demand effects, neither by a “zombie-lending” behaviour or by different impacts 
the financial crisis had on the credit supply of local versus local firms. This leads us to conclude 
that thanks to their greater reliance on soft information, local lenders supported their customers 
to a higher extent during bad times. Taken together, our findings suggest that thanks to relationship 
lending firms borrowing from local banks to a higher extent experienced more credit stability 
during the financial crisis, compared to firms borrowing from not local banks. Yet, one important 
caveat to our findings is that they reflect changes in a limited  time span – we indeed study loan 
outcomes and firms’ financial constraints only in the year before and after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers. Therefore our results do not account for the longer-term, real effects of the financial 
crisis – for instance, for the differential impact of the financial shock on tradeable versus non-
tradeable sectors – which may have affected the lending decisions of local versus non-local banks 
and firms’ probability to report being credit rationed in later years. 
All in all, our paper highlights the importance of relationship lending, particularly in a period of 
financial distress. Local banks, which rely more on soft information than not local banks,  played 
a more supportive role towards the firms they had already a lending history with, thus proving to 
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be important buffers against negative financial shocks for their customers, at least in the period 
immediately following the Financial Crisis. 
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Appendix 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics at baseline 
 Variables Definition Source median mean sd 





p(credrat)  =1 if the firm reports being rationed INVIND 0 0.027 0.163 
ROA  Firm’s profit over total assets CERVED  0.868 1.526 6.115 
rating  Risk assessment on a scale from 1 to 9,  CERVED  5 4.596 1.776 
 where 1: very low risk and 9 very high risk     
leverage Firm’s debt to equity ratio CERVED 56.0198 52.262 30.441 
age Years since foundation CERVED 37 41.772 20.468 
 employees =1 if the firm has 50+ employees INVIND 1 0.635 0.482 
 assets Log of total assets CERVED 9.943            9.750       1.390 
 EBITDA Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortization 
 
CERVED 8.242            9.750        9.376 
Panel B       
       





size bank Banks’ size expressed as an index that goes from 
1 (large banks) to 7 (very small banks) 
Bank of Italy Annual 
Report 5 5.023 1.438 
capital ratio Share of loans to supervisory capital Supervisory Report 0.061 0.101 0.114 
funding ratio Share of loans to non-financial companies not 
financed on the retail market (expressed as 1 
minus the share of loans to non-financial 




Supervisory Report -0.120 -0.040 0.427 
Panel C    
   
 Main bank top 5 The main financing bank belongs to one of the 
main five banking groups in Italy 
 







nbank  Firm’s number of bank relationships  Credit Register 
 7 7.979 5.554 
log(credit) Growth of credit at bank level Credit Register 0.272 0.288 0.909 
share bank Share of credit bank j lends to firm i Credit Register 0.0004 0.0177 0.0852 
p(terminate) Probability to terminate an existing bank lending 
relationship in the following year 
 
Credit Register 0 0.068 0.251 
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Table 7. Balancing checks – single versus multiple-borrowing firms 
This table shows balancing checks between the firms considered in the analysis (column (2), multiple 
borrowing firms that borrow at least from one local and one non-local banks) and single-borrowing firms. 
Mean t-test are used to assess differences between the two samples. Standard errors in brackets. *** 





 firms firms (sample used)  
 (1) (2) (2) – (1) 
Age 40.583 41.772 -1.189 
 (1.959) (0.420) (1.871) 
Share of firms with more than 50 employees 
employees 
0.606 0.635 -0.029 
 (0.043) (0.010) (0.044) 
EBITDA 9.777 8.763 1.013 
 (1.396) (0.187) (0.872) 
Total borrowed amount (log) 14.018 6.156 -7.862*** 
 (0.554) (0.084) (0.383) 
Assets (log) 9.427 9.933 -0.505*** 
 (0.154) (0.029) (0.128) 
Reliance on local banks (Local firm) 0.084 0.099 -0.015 
 (0.017) (0.002) (0.012) 
=1 if firm in Services 0.047 0.263 0.209*** 
 (0.472) (0.009) (0.040) 














Table 8. Credit rationing, local versus non-local banks 
This table reports estimates of the determinants of firms’ credit rationing. Among regressors, we include our 
main variable of interest, local bank, computed as a weighted average at the firm level of banks’ index of 
localism, the weights being the shares of credit borrowed by the firm from each funding bank; the crisis 
dummy, and their interaction term, local bank*crisis. The dependent variable p(credrat) is obtained by combining 
the outcomes of two separate questions from the Bank of Italy INVIND survey: the first asked whether 
further funding was needed; the second whether banks had turned down requests for credit. We classify firms 
reporting a positive answer to both questions as financially constrained. Column (1) and (2) show Probit 
estimates. Column (3) and (4) show estimates from a LPM, with and without fixed effects. Firms and Banks 
controls added in the specification shown in column (2) and (3) include: ROA, age, number of employees, log 
of assets, risk assessment, number of bank links, industry sector (3-digits code), and a dummy for the local 
credit market the firms is located in. Banks control include: size; funding ratio; capital ratio. Size-Age-
Location-Sector FEs are included in column (4). Standard errors clustered at the firm level in brackets. *** 
coefficient significant at 1 per cent; ** at 5 per cent; * at 10 per cent. Marginal effects displayed in column (1) 
and (2). 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Variable p(credrat) p(credrat) p(credrat) p(credrat) 
     
local bank 0.050 0.115*** 0.094* 0.085 
 (0.032) (0.043) (0.055) (0.054) 
crisis 0.061*** 0.080*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) 
local bank*crisis -0.056* -0.094** -0.071* -0.077* 
 (0.033) (0.037) (0.042) (0.043) 











     
Observations 4,257 2,148 4,257 4,257 












Table 9. Extensive margin of credit 
This table reports estimates of the determinants that a lending relationship between firm i and bank j that was 
in place in 2007 was terminated in 2008. Among regressors, we include our main variable of interest, dlocal, 
which is a dummy that takes the value of one if the bank’s index of localism is above the median and zero 
otherwise. Share bank is the relative share of credit lent by bank j to firm i.  Firms controls added in the 
specification shown in column (2) include: ROA, age, size (number of employees), leverage, risk assessment, 
and number of bank links. Banks controls in column (3) include: size; funding ratio; capital ratio. Robust 





Dep. Variable p(terminate) p(terminate) p(terminate) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
dlocal -0.066*** -0.064*** -0.064*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
share bank -0.212*** -0.258*** -0.249*** 
 (0.081) (0.092) (0.091) 
Firm Controls No Yes Yes 
Bank Controls No No Yes 
    
Observations 15,423 14,944 14,944 












Table 10. Intensive margin of credit 
This table reports OLS estimates of the determinants of banks’ annual rate of credit growth and total (log of) 
credit, at the bank level. We include as regressors our main variable of interests, the dummy dlocal, which takes 
the value of one if the bank’s index of localism is above the median and zero otherwise; the crisis dummy, 
which equals to one in 2008 and zero in 2007, and their interaction term. The dependent variable in column 
(1) and (2) is computed as the difference in log credit granted by bank j between year t and t-1. Robust 
standard errors in brackets. *** coefficient significant at 1 per cent; ** at 5 per cent; * at 10 per cent. 
 
Dep. Variable growth credit growth credit 
 (1) (2) 
dlocal -0.201** -0.471* 
 (0.097) (0.264) 
crisis -0.424*** -0.446*** 
 (0.102) (0.135) 
local*crisis 0.017 0.030 
 (0.126) (0.202) 
Bank FE No Yes 
Observations 673 673 













Table 11. Extensive margin of credit –Firms’ characteristics 
This table reports estimates of the determinants that a lending relationship between firm i and bank j that was in place in 
2007 was terminated in 2008. Among regressors, we include our main variable of interest, dlocal, which is a dummy that 
takes the value of one if the bank’s index of localism is above the median and zero otherwise. We then include the 
interactions between dlocal and firms’ balance sheet characteristics: ROA, leverage, age, EBITDA, rating and size. Share 
bank is the relative share of credit lent by bank j to firm i.  Robust standard errors in brackets. *** coefficient significant 
at 1 per cent; ** at 5 per cent; * at 10 per cent. Marginal effects displayed. 
 
Dep. Variable terminate terminate terminate terminate terminate terminate terminate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
dlocal -0.064*** -0.007 -0.038 -0.051*** 0.004 -0.083*** -0.083*** 
 (0.011) (0.034) (0.032) (0.016) (0.049) (0.017) (0.010) 
ROA -0.002***       
 (0.001)       
dlocal*ROA 0.001       
 (0.003)       
leverage  0.001***      
  (0.000)      
dlocal*leverage  -0.001**      
  (0.001)      
age   -0.000*     
   (0.000)     
dlocal*age   -0.001     
   (0.001)     
EBITDA    0.0003    
    (0.0003)    
dlocal*EBITDA    -0.002    
    (0.002)    
rating     0.008***   
     (0.002   
dlocal*rating     -0.016*   
     (0.010)   
firm size      0.001  
      (0.006)  
dlocal*firm size      0.050  
      (0.042)  
share credit -0.217*** -0.218*** -0.210*** -0.224*** -0.218*** -0.216*** -1.301*** 
 (0.080) (0.083) (0.081) (0.080) (0.083) (0.081) (0.249) 
dlocal*share credit       1.282*** 
       (0.255) 
Observations 15,423 15,423 15,423 15,423 15,423 15,423 15,423 
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